Pakistan's past to predict the future -whether Pakistan will fail as a state or manage to scrape through all its troubles and emerge as a 'normal state at peace with its neighbours'?
[2] Cohen's point of departure is to assess 'failure'-a term that he thinks is imprecisely used to describe Pakistan. He argues that to make such an accusation one needs a nuanced definition of failure. If failure is defined as the inability to live up to past expectations, to deal with catastrophe, to run a successful economy and to lead the country with a certain vision in mind, then Pakistan's performance has been dismal. But Cohen pushes the line that it is not a failed state as the possibility of resurrection is not out of reach.
[3] To provide evidence for his line of argument Cohen takes a historical approach that traces the evolution of both the idea and state of Pakistan. In subsequent chapters Cohen [5] The title of the book is misleading-it is not so much the idea of Pakistan that Cohen wants to discuss. Instead he has different analytical goals; he wants to argue that the current state of Pakistan is the result of the unresolved tensions in the ideas that prevailed at the time Pakistan was founded. Cohen's entire analysis is geared towards explaining why Pakistan is a so-called 'failed state' and how the US can secure its interest in South Asia using Pakistan as an ally.
[6] It is not clear from his analysis if Cohen thinks that Pakistan's development has been path dependent. If so, is Pakistan in the throes of a critical juncture where choices made now will put it on a different developmental trajectory? This is the question that Cohen has in mind when he starts the chapter on 'Pakistan's Futures' (p. 267). He approaches this question not by engaging the concept of critical juncture analytically but by arguing that it is not the first time that
Pakistan finds itself at a crossroads and not the first time that the country has resurrected itself from chaos and altered the course of development. The book also raises the question whether Cohen's ideational argument is about Pakistan being locked-in because the unresolved tension amongst ideas still persists? It is entirely conceivable to argue that the elite or 'establishment' will continue to pursue the present course because its interests are too embedded in the status quo as it stands today. In Cohen's defense, it is a difficult and impractical undertaking to provide a sure recipe for successful outcomes in Pakistan's political development and the mechanisms by which that change can be made feasible.
[9] Clearly institutions are important to Cohen's analysis yet most political scientists will criticize the book for not having paid enough attention to the interrelation between social, economic and political institutions. For instance one gaping hole in the book is that the role played by the judiciary in legitimizing martial law is a theme barely mentioned. The state of the judiciary as the third organ of state also reflects the importance paid to the rule of law-a significant attribute of political institutions. Secondly, when discussing political parties, Cohen does not delve deeper into the role of the MQM party and how it has been a significant alternative to the PPP in the province of Sindh. One would like to see these topics addressed more comprehensively in future works by the author.
[10] My critique of the book should not detract from its virtues. It is a significant achievement on two levels, first because it provides an introduction to Pakistan's political, economic and social history in broad strokes and second, Cohen is not only descriptive but also prescriptive about Pakistan's problems.
